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The book under review is a considerably revised version of a PhD dissertation at Duke University’s 
Department of History that was successfully defended in 2013 (“The Night Watchman: Hans Speier 
and the Making of the American National Security State”). It relates the biography of Hans Speier 
(1905–1990), a German social scientists who immigrated to the United States after the Nazi seizure 
of power and became a widely recognized and respected policy advisor, analyst, and institution-
builder in his new home. Democracy in Exile describes Speier’s intellectual development across the 
variety of contexts in which he was active.  
To all those interested in the history of the social science-foreign policy nexus during and after the 
Second World War, Speier is a figure sufficiently central to warrant interest in his biography. Born 
in Berlin as a single child to middle class parents, Speier studied sociology in Heidelberg, where his 
supervisors included Emil Lederer, Karl Mannheim, and Karl Jaspers. Upon completing his studies, 
he returned to Berlin, worked in various positions related to the Social Democratic Party (SPD), 
wrote articles for party outlets, and taught at the Hochschule für Politik, a higher education school 
that offered academic evening courses to members of the working class. When the political situation 
worsened, he accepted an offer by Alvin Johnson to join the New School for Social Research in New 
York City, where he became the youngest member of faculty at the “University in Exile.” During the 
Second World War, he entered government service and rose to fame within the agencies for his 
abilities in analyzing Nazi propaganda, a line of research he had begun earlier together with émigré 
psychoanalyst Ernst Kris. After the end of the war, Hans Speier felt that he could not return to 
academic life. He became the inaugurating director of the Social Science Division of the RAND 
Corporation, a think tank with headquarters in Santa Monica, CA. Soon after its opening, RAND 
became a central player in the science-foreign policy networks that created the strategy of the United 
States during the Cold War.  
While Speier’s career in itself would deserve a biography, Bessner takes it a step further. Speier’s 
intellectual career, Bessner argues, reveals some important lessons with regard to the history of 
political and strategic thought more generally. The most important of these lessons is that in alleged 
contrast to the claims of other historians, Speier’s case shows that the global political situation of a 
two-side confrontation that emerged in the 1950s was only one source informing the core beliefs of 
U.S. defense intellectuals. Beyond that, their thinking was shaped fundamentally by ideas, debates, 
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and events that had taken place in Europe twenty years earlier. The ideology of the U.S. National 
Security State, Bessner suggests, can be fully understood only if the collapse of the Weimar republic, 
the ensuing Nazi takeover, and the repercussions of these events for social scientists and intellectuals 
enter the picture. Fear of repetition was a fundamental emotion among many exiles who, by serving 
as analysts in the war effort and by remaining in the policy-oriented research and analysis networks 
after the end of the war, played a considerable role in shaping U.S. foreign policy. Whereas historians 
have hitherto emphasized the discontinuities in strategic thought that were brought about by the 
atomic bomb, Bessner claims that, provided one broadens the view to include the European history 
and traditions of thought, there are crucial continuities to be found.  
The book’s introduction—“Democracy, Expertise, and U.S. Foreign Policy”—describes the main 
puzzle in Speier’s intellectual biography: his conviction that while democratic values were important, 
democracies were weak. In times of crisis, then, the responsibility of intellectuals was to directly offer 
advice to the decision makers. If intellectuals wanted to contribute to avoiding authoritarian 
disasters, their audience had to be the elite, not the demos. For democracy’s own sake, democratic 
ideals had to be put in exile—hence the title.  
Chapter 1—“Masses and Marxism in Weimar Germany”—follows Speier’s childhood in Berlin, his 
studies in Berlin and, from 1926 on, in Heidelberg, and his return to Berlin two years later, upon 
receiving his PhD summa cum laude with a thesis on “The Philosophy of History of Ferdinand 
Lasalle.” Two intellectuals were influential for Speier during this period. One was Karl Mannheim 
(1893–1947), whose project of a sociology of knowledge attracted Speier and informed his decision 
to pursue a PhD in Heidelberg. Mannheim’s works were intensively discussed in a circle in 
Heidelberg that, besides Speier, included intellectuals and scholars who would later rise to 
prominence, such as Norbert Elias, Werner Falk, Hans Gerth, Ruth Neuberg, and Svend Riemer (cf. 
p. 21).  
The second person was the Heidelberg economist Emil Lederer (1882–1939), who offered Speier an 
assistantship that allowed him to cover the expenses of his studies (his father refused to do so). Upon 
completion of his studies, Lederer connected him to the Federal Ministry of Finance in Berlin, then 
led by socialist Rudolf Hilferding, where Speier landed a job as analyst.  
While these two persons certainly exerted considerable influence on the development of Speier’s own 
thinking, as Bessner shows, more important than these were the political events happening in these 
years, and most crucially the collapse of the Weimar republic. This downfall of a democratic order, 
Bessner argues, and the ensuing triumph of the Nazi party convinced Speier of a series of ideas that 
he held throughout his life and that also informed the “logic of governance he helped institutionalize 
in the Cold War United States” (p. 17). The lessons that Speier drew from the political events were: 
1) Democracy is a weak form of governance and can quickly be destroyed in confrontation with 
radical movements. 2) Intellectuals were partly responsible for the Weimar collapse, because they 
stuck to the naïve idea that the masses could be educated to make thoughtful political decisions. 3) 
Marxism was just another set of radical ideas threatening democracy. And finally, 4) while Speier 
had developed quite a deep understanding of democracy—as an idea fostering economic, cultural, 
and political equality— in his youth, the term to him did not refer to much more than procedural 
equality. Everything that was not authoritarianism could qualify as democracy.  
Speier’s convictions consolidated over the coming years in Berlin, which saw him, besides his job as 
ministry analyst, working as an editor for the Ullstein publishing house, as assistant to Lederer when 
the latter moved from Heidelberg to the University of Berlin, and as a part-time teacher at the 
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Hochschule für Politik, a college funded by the social democrats to provide education, mostly in 
evening courses, to the Berlin’s working strata. These views were further fortified when, after the 
Nazi takeover in 1933, Speier on the recommendation of Lederer became the intermediary for Alvin 
S. Johnson’s (1874–1971) attempt to invite renowned European scholars to join the “University in 
Exile,” which Johnson planned to set up as part of his New School for Social Research in New York 
City (Krohn 1987). Chapter 2—“The Social Role of the Intellectual Exile”—covers Speier’s last years 
in Berlin, his decision to go to the United States and join the “University in Exile,” and the people he 
met upon his arrival as well as the thoughts he wrote down during this period.  
Chapter 3—“Public Opinion, Propaganda, and Democracy in Crisis”—then covers Speier’s most 
important scientific project during the war years: the Research Project on Totalitarian 
Communication that he co-led with the Austrian psychoanalyst and art historian Ernst Kris (1900–
1957). The project resulted in a book called German Radio Propaganda written by Kris and Speier, 
which became a heavily used point of reference for the propaganda studies undertaken by various 
U.S. wartime institutions such as the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) or the Office of War 
Information (OWI), as chapter 4—“Psychological Warfare in Theory and Practice”—relates. The book 
also led to Speier being selected to head the German Desk of OWI, where he became responsible for 
developing the guidelines for the propaganda materials that were to be distributed in Germany. As 
most social science and humanities scholars involved in the U.S. war effort, Speier moved repeatedly 
and easily between various organizations. After the end of the war, he was also sent to Germany on 
behalf of the OWI “to counsel those who are concerned with information activities with respect to 
Germany” (as the Executive Order by President Harry S. Truman read, cited on pp. 121–2). 
After his wartime experiences, Speier realized that he was unwilling to return to the New School, 
which had put him on leave for his government service. He did return for some months, but felt like 
“a fish out of water” (autobiographic interview, cited on p. 139). Thus, he was quite interested in 
listening to what the RAND Corporation, a newly established think tank funded mainly by the U.S. 
Air Force and Douglas Aircraft Company, had to offer: the position of director of the yet to be 
established Social Science Division. After some negotiations, Speier accepted the position and joined 
RAND in 1948. The history of this think tank has been narrated quite a few times (e.g., in Smith 
1966; Kaplan 1983; Collins 2002; Ghamari-Tabrizi 2005), and Chapter 5—“The Making of a Defense 
Intellectual”—sums up the literature quite elegantly and with a focus on the Social Science Division.  
As this chapter and the ensuing chapter 6—“The Adviser”—aptly show, Speier was convinced that 
the addressees of social scientific policy advice were the deciding elites, not the people. As Bessner 
puts it, “For Speier, democratic foreign policy was not by the people, of the people, and for the people, 
but was for the people, by the intellectual, who had finally assumed his or her proper place within 
the “shadow” American state” (p. 155). To make this point, Bessner describes a series of research and 
analytical works that Speier carried out in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The most prominent—and 
arguably the most influential—among them was Project Troy, a large interdisciplinary research 
project funded by the Ford Foundation with the intent to identify and provide solutions for the main 
problems—theoretical, cultural, and technological—faced by anti-communist propaganda (cf. Nedell 
1998; Schwoch 2009).  
Apart from the intellectual consequences of Project Troy, it also led to a series of organizational 
innovations, and Speier played an active role in two of these. Already before Project Troy began, 
Speier had close relations with a few officials of the Ford Foundation. His participation in the project 
only served to strengthen these ties. Chapter 7—“The Institution-Builder”—explores how the 
networks that had brought Project Troy to life also created (or helped create) the Center for Advanced 
 
Dayé on Bessner 
Serendipities 5.2020 (1–2): 71–75 | DOI: 10.7146/serendipities.v5i1-2.128032   74 
Study in the Behavioral Sciences (CASBS) at Stanford University and the Research Program in 
International Communication at MIT’s Center for International Studies (CIS). On all these 
occasions, Speier succeeded in getting some of his ideas to materialize, although, as Bessner shows, 
not all of them.  
Chapter 8—“Social Science and Its Discontents”—takes the reader back to the RAND Corporation 
and discusses the role of the social sciences at this organization that valued numerical analysis higher 
than qualitative or interpretive scholarly approaches. Consequently, and in stark contrast to the self-
proclaimed culture of “interdisciplinarity” at RAND, the Social Science Division struggled to get the 
recognition within RAND that it deemed adequate. In this context, Bessner discusses the 
development of political gaming, a qualitative technique of crisis simulation, as a reaction towards 
the perceived expectations of other RAND divisions and as an attempt to anchor social scientific 
perspectives more broadly in RAND’s research agenda. A brief conclusion—“Speier, Expertise, and 
Democracy after 1960”—describes Speier’s move from RAND to the University of Massachusetts, 
Amherst, one year prior to his obligatory retirement date, and the last years of his life.  
Bessner’s book is a masterful exemplar of an intellectual biography—densely written without getting 
dry, engaged without losing the distance. The two large theses of the book—that there are 
considerable continuities between the lessons from the collapse of the Weimar republic and the 
emerging U.S. national security state, and that the elitist view on the science-democracy nexus 
promoted by Speier was one of these continuities—are well developed and corroborated by the 
presented materials. Beyond that, in light of some recent publications, the intervention also seems 
timely. 
Clearly, an intellectual biography has to emphasize some ideas as more important than others. It 
must do so in order to not lose its narrative in a marsh of complexities. However, this has inevitable 
repercussions. Regardless of how central they might have been to his life, the four convictions of 
Speier described above focus on the social and political role of social scientific policy 
recommendations. They do not, however, reveal much about how Speier understood the 
epistemological nature of the social sciences. What was scientific about social science, in his view? 
What did make it a science? The theme appears in several places throughout the book (and therefore 
Speier’s life)—for instance, when Speier claimed that Marxism would have to “shake off the positivist 
calcification of its method” (p. 32); when he criticized the New School for failing to provide proper 
training in empirical research methods and statistics (p. 138); when Speier figures as a consultant to 
one of the key promotors of the “Behavioral Sciences” (chapter 7); or when he defended the 
qualitative-historical approach of his Social Science Division at RAND (chapter 8). The fact that 
Speier’s teacher, Karl Mannheim, had developed a very influential epistemological view of the social 
sciences, which lies at odds with some of the standards of the Behavioral Sciences that grew in the 
1950s, gives particular urgency to the question of why this perspective did not receive more sustained 
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